INTRODUCTION
In Laffont and Tirole (1986) we studied how cost observability helps a regulator controlling a private or public firm when both adverse selection and moral hazard affect their relationship. In particular, we showed that under cost observability, there is a trade-off between revelation of information through the selection of an incentive contract, and efficient ex-post production. The optimal sharing of overruns was derived and shown to be linear. The analysis was carried out in a one period model. Of course, relationships between firms and regulators are often repeated. The purpose of this paper is to extend our analysis of incentive contracts to a dynamic framew~rk.~ 'This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation and by the Direction de la Prevision. We thank D. Kreps, R. Radner, two anonymous referees, and especially Bernard Caillaud and Eric Maskin for very helpful discussions and comments.
'~a r o n and Besanko (1984) and Roberts (1983) study long term relationships with full commitment under various assumptions concerning the type of adverse selection. One main result is that, in the independent case (each period a new independent variable of adverse selection is drawn), the optimal mechanism yields the first best from the second period on and all the inefficiency occurs in period 1. Intuitively this is because at the time the contract is signed, the agent does not really have an informational advantage from period 2 on. In the perfect correlation case (a variable of adverse selection is drawn at the beginning for the whole relationship), the optimal mechanism is the optimal static mechanism. Baron and Besanko (1987) consider multiperiod incentive schemes under adverse selection for an alternative assumption about commitment. The main focus of their paper is the "fairness case," in which the regulator has a limited commitment in the second period: he must be "fair" to the firm with which he is committed to stay. An interesting result of their analysis is that separation is feasible in the first period, contrary to the case of no commitment at all (see Proposition 1). They also show that the regulator may or may not want to fully separate the types, but always wants to separate them at the low-cost end of the distribution. Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985) analyze repeated adverse selection in the perfect correlation case with adverse selection and no commitment. Their analysis focuses on optimal linear incentive Section 2 presents the model, which is a simplified version of our one-period earlier model. In each period a very valuable indivisible project must be carried out. The ex-post cost of the project depends on two variables: the firm's intrinsic efficiency, and its level of "effort" during the period. The firm's efficiency is constant and known to the firm, but not to the regulator. The firm's effort is not observed by the regulator either. The incentive scheme (transfer to the firm) thus depends on observed cost only. For reference, the optimal regulatory scheme under full information about the firm is derived.
Section 3 solves for the optimal incentive scheme in the static (one period) incomplete information case, and sets up the dynamic framework. For the rest of the paper, we consider the two-period version of the basic model. The regulator chooses a first-period incentive scheme, which specifies a transfer to the firm as a function of the first-period observed cost. The firm reacts to this incentive scheme by choosing a first-period level of effort. The regulator then rewards the firm and updates his beliefs about the latter's efficiency using the cost observation. In the second-period the regulator chooses the optimal regulatory scheme given his posterior beliefs, and the firm chooses a second-period effort and is rewarded.
We are thus assuming that the regulator cannot commit himself not to use in the second period the information conveyed by the firm's first-period performance. This assumption, which, we believe, is reasonable in a wide range of applications, certainly deserves comment. The simplest way to motivate it is the changing principal framework. For instance, the current administration cannot bind future ones3 (the changing principal framework also applies to planning models). Noncommitment situations are also very common in relationships between private parties, and in particular in organizations. Contracts are costly to write and contingencies are often hard to foresee, which gives rise to the allocation of discretion to some members of the organization (as emphasized by Coase (1937) , Simon (1951) , Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , and Grossman and Hart (1986) ). The existence of discretion creates scope for the parties who exercise t h s discretion to use the information revealed by the other par tie^.^ (We have in schemes. Furthermore, it considers only the two-type case, which leads to a much weaker emphasis on pooling than the continuum of types framework envisioned in this paper. (See also the literature on the ratchet effect using nonoptimal mechanisms, Weitzman (1980 ), Holmstrom (1982a 3~n this interpretation the discount factor of the principal is likely to be lower than the firm's. This feature can be embodied at no cost in our model, and reinforces our central theme that pooling is very likely in ratcheting situations (the principal then finds it even more costly to induce some separation).
4~s Katz and Kahn (1978) observe:
...there is the tradition among workers, and it is not without some factual basis, that management cannot be relied upon to maintain a high rate of pay for those making considerably more than the standard and that their increased efforts will only result in their "being sweated." There is, then, the temporal dimension of whether the piece rates that seem attractive today will be maintained tomorrow if individual productivity increases substantially [p. 4111. Joel Demski mentioned to us the case of Levi's garment workers hiding inventories not to look too productive. For an interesting description of problems created by piece rates, see Gibbons (1987). mind, for example, the case of new tasks or new technologies whch are costly or impossible to describe in advance, and such that the agent's ability to handle them is positively correlated with this ability to handle current tasks or technologies.) As the theory of incomplete contracts is still in its infancy, we prefer to couch the model in a regulatory framework to motivate noncommitment.
The focus of this paper is the ratchet efect: an agent with a high performance today will tomorrow face a demanding incentive scheme. He should thus be reluctant to convey favorable information early in the r e l a t i~n s h i~.~ The ratchet effect is often perceived a serious problem in planned economies, in regulated industries (for instance, cost reductions of electric utilities often do not benefit the utilities after the usual regulatory lag), or in private contracting (for instance, the rents of successful lessee dealers of gasoline increase considerably). The purpose of the paper is to formalize and confirm the general intuition about the ratchet effect. Indeed, we show that, with a continuum of potential abilities for the agent, and for any first-period incentive scheme, no separating equilibrium exists. Furthermore, when the range of potential abilities is small, the principal can do no better in the first period than imposing "much pooling" (in a sense to be defined later). This holds even when, in the static framework, full separation is optimal. These two results are derived in Section 4. Section 5 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria. Section 6 briefly studies the case of imperfect correlation of cost over time. Section 7 concludes.
THE MODEL
We consider a two-period model in which a firm (the agent) must implement a project with cost structure in each period:
C, = / 3 -e, ( t = 1,2) where e, is the level of cost reduction or "effort" performed by the firm's manager in period t, and P is a parameter known only by the manager. (In contrast with Laffont and Tirole (1986) , we have not extended the results of this paper to allow for cost uncertainty.)
Each period the manager's utility level is s -$(e), where s is the net (i.e., in addition to cost) monetary transfer he receives from the regulator and $(e) is his disutility of effort (4' > 0, 4''> 0). Note that we adopt the convention that the principal pays the cost. This, of course, is purely definitional. For simplicity, we he behavior is at variance with that described in Holmstrom (1982b) . Our assumptions differ from his in at least three respects. First, Holmstrom assumes that the efficiency parameter is unknown to both the principal and the agent. Second, the agent's cost (or profit) is observable, but not verifiable (so s, cannot be contingent on c,). Third, Holmstrom's agent faces a competitive market, in which the transfer depends on past performance, while our agent's second-period outside opportunities are independent of the first-period outcome. A systematic study of the effect of these points of departure between the two models would be worthwhile, but is out of the scope of this paper. Let us simply notice that as an outcome the agent has fairly different behaviors in the two set-ups. Holmstrom's agent tries to prove he is efficient while ours may try to prove the contrary. will allow any real valued level of effort and just require that 4' be bounded below by k E (0,l). Also, we assume that 4' goes to infinity when e goes to infinity and we define e* by J/'(e*) = 1.
The regulator (principal) observes cost but not the effort level or the value of the parameter p. He has some prior cumulative distribution function Fl(P) on [p, PI.We will assume that Fl has a density fl and that fl is differentiable and b: unded away from zero on [p,p] . The probability distribution should be interpreted as an objective proba5ility that both the principal (the regulator) and the agent (the firm's manager) share before date 1.
Let u be, each period, the social utility of the project, which can be viewed for simplicity as a public good, i.e., as not sold on the market.6 The gross payment made by the planner to the firm is s + c. We assume that there is a distortionary cost X > 0 incurred to raise each unit of money (through excise taxes for example).
Consumers' welfare in period t is:
Under perfect information ( P =-/3 = p), a utilitarian regulator would solve, each period t :
The individual rationality constraint (2.2) says that the utility level of the firm's manager must be nonnegative to obtain his participation. (The perfect information problem being stationary, the constraint and, therefore, the allocation will be the same at each period. Hence, we do not distinguish the per period and intertemporal rationality constraints.)
The optimal solution is characterized by (2.4) e, = e*, where ql(e*) = 1.
The individual rationality constraint is binding in each period because there is a social loss due to transfers and the marginal disutility of effort is equated to marginal cost savings.
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
As a preliminary, we solve the static regulation problem under imperfect information, the dynamic problem with commitment, and we set up the dynamic problem under no-commitment. 6We will assume that in the static framework it is always worth carrying out the project. It is sufficient to take u large enough. This assumption enables us to avoid the issue of determining the cut-off level above which firms do not operate in the one-period framework. In Fact? below, we will however consider the more general case in which the cutoff point is not necessarily /3.
(a) Static Regulation
The regulator has two observables, namely the level of net transfer, s, and the level of cost, c. In general, the contract will be a function s(c) specifying the transfer received by the manager for each value of observed cost. Let us make the following familiar assumption on the prior distribution: ASSUMPTION M: Fl/fl is nondecreasing.
Assumption M, which says that the hazard rate is monotone, is commonly made in the incentives literature and is satisfied by many distributions. Assumption M is not required for the main propositions of the paper (it is used only in Proposition 4). We make this assumption to give separation its best chance: as is well-known, M ensures that the principal does not want to induce any bunching in the static case.
Let us give an informal overview of the properties of the optimal contracts. First, the firm's "utility" or "rent" or, by abuse of terminology, "profit"
is a nonincreasing function of P, since a more efficient firm can always produce at the same cost as a less efficient firm by working less. From the "envelope theorem," the derivative of the rent is equal to (-+'(e(P))) where e(P) is the optimal effort of a firm with type P when it faces the incentive scheme s(.). This tells us exactly how fast the firm's rent must grow with productivity for a given effort schedule (for the effort schedule to be implementable, a second-order condition is required as well, that can easily be checked). To maximize the social welfare function the regulator must trade off two conflicting objectives: (i) production efficiency, which requires that the marginal disutility of income +'(e(P)) be equal to one for all p, and (ii) the elimination of costly rents II(P). To reduce rents for the more efficient firms, the regulator can-and will-encourage less effort than in the first best.
The following simple results summarize the static analysis that is relevant to our model; they are special cases of results in Laffont-Tirole (1986) (which allows a choice of scale and cost uncertainty). (e*(P) denotes firm P 7 s effort for the optimal incentive scheme):
FACT1: Under full information about the firm's type ( P = /3 = p), the firm -obtains no rent, and its effort is optimal: +'(e*(P)) = 1.
FACT 2: If p denotes the supremum in [P, PI of types that are willing to participate (i.e., not to exercise their e s t option) for the optimal incentive scheme, then n ( p ) = 0.
FACT 3: There is no distortion for the most efficient firm:
FACT 4: Under Assumption M and if the regulator's optimization problem has a unique interior s~l u t i o n ,~ e*(P) is nonincreasing. This implies that the optimal incentive scheme fully separates the various types. Together with Fact 3, this also implies that for all P, +'(e*(P)) < 1. Indeed, Furthermore, for an "unexpected type" P < P (recall that the planner's beliefs are assumed to have support [P, p]),firm /3 's rent for one optimal scheme (which allows only costs in the expecied range) is Fact 1 was proved earlier. Facts 2 and 3 are familiar from the incentive literature. Fact 4 is used only to prove Proposition 4. Fact 1contains the earlier observation that the agent does not enjoy any rent when the principal has full information. Fact 2 says that under asymmetric information the least productive of the active types does not obtain any rent. Fact 3 is the classic "no distortion at the top result." Fact 4 simply says that under Assumption M, the optimal effort is suboptimal. It also gives the rent for an unexpected efficient type, who is forced to mimic the behavior of the /3 type.
-(b) Dynamic Optimization with Commitment
We now start our investigation of the two-period version of the model. We let 6 denote the discount factor common to the two parties. The intertemporal payoff functions are thus Il, + 6112 for the firm and W, + 6W2 for the regulator.
In this subsection only, we consider the case in which the regulator is able to commit himself at date one to an intertemporal incentive scheme (and has incomplete information). In particular, he can commit himself to a second period scheme which is not optimal given his information at that date. We notice that the regulator offers twice the same scheme (see Baron-Besanko (1984) and Roberts (1983) ). In a sense, it is optimal for the regulator to commit not to use the information revealed by the firm in the first period during the second period. Thus, commitment in this model eliminates dynamics and ratcheting.
(c) No Commitment: Presentation of the Dynamic Game
We will assume in the rest of the paper that the regulator cannot commit himself to a second-period incentive scheme. He chooses the second-period 'A small or ( p--P ) small or Y'' > 0 are sufficient conditions for this (see LaKont-Tirole (1986)).
incentive scheme optimally given his beliefs about the firm's type at that date. As explained above, these beliefs depend on the first-period cost, and on the firm's equilibrium first-period strategy (the firm's actual choice of effort cannot be observed by the regulator). For any first-period incentive scheme s,(c,), each firm p chooses a level of effort taking into account both the effect on the first-period reward and on the regulator's inference about its efficiency. Lastly, the regulator chooses the first-period incentive scheme knowing that the firm will take a dynamic perspective.
We allow the firm to quit the relationship (and to obtain its reservation utility 0) at any moment. Let X, = 1if the firm accepts the incentive scheme at t, and xt = 0 if it quits.
To summarize, the regulator's strategy is a pair of incentive schemes {s,(c,)) and {s2(c2; s,(-), c,)} and the firm's strategy a pair of effort levels and acceptance choices {(el, x,),(e,, x,)} conditional on the firm's type. These strategies must form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium: (PI) (e,, x,) is optimal for the firm given s,(-); (P2) s, is optimal for the regulator given his beliefs F2(. Isl(.), c,); (P3) (el, xl) is optimal for the firm given s,(.) and the fact that the regulator's second-period scheme depends on c,; (P4) s, is optimal for the regulator given subsequent strategies, and (B) F,(. Isl(.), c,) is derived from the prior F,, the firm's strategy given by (P3), and the observed cost c,, using Bayes' rule.' Note that for conciseness we omitted the arguments in the strategies. They, of course, depend on previous histories. So el and X, depend on the proposed incentive scheme s,(-); like the posterior beliefs the second period incentive scheme s,(.) depends on the first period one s,(.) and the first period cost; and e, and x2 depend on s,(-), c,, and s,(.). (Of course, in equilibrium the first period arguments may not be relevant to second period decisions except through the posterior beliefs.) Note also that (P2) requires the regulator to choose in the second period an optimal static incentive scheme relative to his posterior beliefs, even off the equilibrium path. And, similarly, we require that the firm play optimally for any history of the game.
Last, consider an arbitrary first-period incentive scheme s,(.). A continuation equilibrium is a set of strategies (excluding s,(.)) and updating rule that satisfies (PI), (P2), (P3), and (B). In other words, it is an equilibrium for an exogenously given first-period incentive scheme. It is said to be fully separating if the function p + j 3 -e,(p) is one-to-one.
RATCHETING AND POOLING
This section characterizes equilibria. For notational simplicity, we drop the index for the first-period incentive scheme: s(.). In Proposition 1, we consider s( a ) as given. Proposition 1 shows that even when, in the static case, full separation is feasible and desirable (as in the case under Assumption M), it is not even feasible in the dynamic case. The intuition behind the proof of this proposition is the following. If the agent fully reveals his information in the first period, he enjoys no second period rent (see Fact 1). Thus, he must maximize his first-period payoff. Now, suppose an agent with type P deviates from his equilibrium strategy and produces at the same cost as if he had type ( P + dB), where dp > 0. From the envelope theorem, he loses only a second-order profit in the first period. On the other hand, he enjoys a first-order rent in the second period, because the principal is convinced he has type ( P + dp). Thus, he would like to pool with agent ( p + dB). The proof makes this intuition rigorous: 9,10 PROOFOF PROPOSITION 1: Consider two types of firms: P < P'. Type /3 produces at cost c and receives s. Type P' produces at cost c' + c and receives s f .
(If strategies are mixed, c and c' are realizations of the optima for types /3 and P'.) If the equilibrium is separating, c signals that the firm has type P; and similarly for (P', c'). So, in the second period, the firms are put at their individual rationality level, i.e., make a zero profit. Imagine that type P' deviates and chooses to produce at cost c. In the second period this firm makes a zero profit, as the second-period incentive scheme is designed to extract all the surplus from the more efficient firm p and firm p' can quit. In contrast, if firm /3 deviates in the first period and produces at cost c', then it will make a strictly positive profit in the second period (since the less efficient firm makes a zero profit). We denote this profit I f ( P IP') > 0. Optimization by both types of firm requires that:
and Adding (4.1) and (4.2) we obtain:
Convexity of + and (4.3) then imply that c < c'.
Thus, if {c(P), s(P)) denotes the first-period allocation, c must be an increasing function of p. Therefore, c is differentiable almost everywhere. On the other hand, s must be decreasing (otherwise an agent of type /3 would imitate an agent of type P'; P' > P), and therefore is differentiable almost everywhere. Consider now a point of differentiability P, say. If firm /3 deviates and behaves like firm 9~e can contrast our result with the results of existence of a separating equilibrium in classic signalling models such as those of Spence (1974) and Milgrom-Roberts (1982) . In those models, the second-period gain for a type P of being perceived as type ( P + dB) is (at least almost everywhere) equal to the loss of being perceived as type ( P -dp). In our model, the latter loss is equal to zero because of the exit option, and the equality holds nowhere.
' OMilgrom (1987) uses this result in a clever way to show how in a dynamic hidden action model (as opposed to adverse selection) and in the absence of commitment, the principal can never have full information about an unobservable investment (that is, the equilibrium necessarily involves a mixed strategy in investment).
( P -dP)(dp > 0), it does not get a profit in the second period. Thus:
Taking the limit as dB goes to zero:
If firm p deviates and behaves like firm ( P + dB), it obtains a second period surplus. Although its magnitude turns out to be irrelevant, this second period surplus is easy to compute: in the second period, firm /3 must mimic firm ( P + dP)'s outcome. Thus it saves dB on effort. As the planner (believes he) has complete information on the firm, the marginal disutility of effort is equal to one.
Thus IT(P IP + dB) = dB. We thus obtain or by taking the limit as dp goes to zero, (4.7) 0 2 s'(P) + 4'(P -c(P))cf(P) + 6, which contradicts (4.5).
Proposition 1 shows that at least some pooling is necessary for almost every type of firm. There exists no nondegenerate subinterval of [P, 81 over which separation occurs.'l The next proposition shows that, for small uncertainty ( ( p -P ) small), the principal imposes "much pooling," in a sense defined below. At thi; stage, it is worth emphasizing that under Assumption M, the principal induces full separation in the static case, even for small uncertainty.
We will say that a continuation equilibrium exhibits infinite reswitching if there exist two equilibrium cost levels c0 and c1 and an infinite ordered sequence in [ _ P ,~] : { P~)s uch that producing at cost c0 (respectively, cl) is an optimal strategy for P,, (respectively, P,,,,) for all k. (In this definition and in the next, "an optimal strategy" can be taken to mean that the strategy is in the type's choice at the equilibrium, not just that it is a weak best response.) An equilibrium which exhibits infinite reswitching is, thus, very complex; in particular, an increasing well-ordered partition of the interval [p, p ] into subintervals such that every type in a given subinterval chooses the same cost level (partition equilibrium) does not exist. An example of an equilibrium exhibiting infinite reswitching will be provided in Appendix A.
We will say that, for a given (small) E, a continuation equilibrium exhibits pooling over a large scale (1 -E) if there exist a cost level c and two values Dl < p, such that (p, -pl)/(p-P) 2 1-E, and c is an optimal strategy for types Pl and P,. In other words, one can find two types which are arbitrarily far apart (where arbitrarily refers to the choice of E) and pool. Note that, of course, a "The impossibility of separation is an extreme illustration of the general fact that the revelation principle does not apply to repeated relationships in the absence of commitment. For a weaker notion of the revelation principle under such circumstances, see Kumar (1985) . (In Kumar's version of the revelation principle, an informed player must communicate a probability distribution over his type to the other player.) --full pooling equilibrium (all types choose the same cost target) involves pooling over a large scale (for E = 0).
Let us now state Proposition 2. For this purpose, we consider a sequence of economies with fixed p,and we let the lower bound of the interval pnconverge to p (the density is thus obtained by successive truncations of the Gtial density:
PROPOSITION 2 (Small Uncertainty): Consider an arbitrary first-period incentive scheme s(.). For any E > 0, there exists Be < p such that for all n such that P,, > Be, there exists no continuation equilibrium which yields the principal a highe?payo~ than his optimal full pooling contract and which either: ( a ) involves less than a fraction (1 -E) of firms producing at the same cost, or (b) does not exhibit both infinite reswitching and pooling over a large scale (1 -E).
Thus, for small uncertainty, the equilibrium must either be almost a full pooling equilibrium (almost all types have the same cost target) or exhibit infinite reswitching (complexity) and pooling over a large scale.
PROOFOF PROPOSITION 2: The starting point of the proof consists in noticing that when tends to p, the distortion in the regulator's welfare relative to full information and associated with the best (full) pooling scheme tends to 0.12 Thus, to prove the proposition, it suffices to prove that the distortion remains bounded away from zero as long as the continuation equilibrium does not satisfy either (a) or (b).
Consider a first-period incentive scheme s(c), and two distinct levels of cost c0 and c1 that belong to the equilibrium path (i.e., that are best strategies for some types of agent) for some n (we will delete the subscript n in what follows). Let P' (i = 0,l) denote the supremum of types P for which playing c' is optimal, and who are still active in the second period (i.e., are willing not to exercise their exit option) when they play c'. Pi will be called the "supremum for c'." P' does not obtain any second period rent when playing c' (see Fact 2). Assume for the moment that Po> pl. Thus, firm Po does not obtain any second period rent when playing c1 either. Letting II(P 1 c') denote firm P 's second-period rent when it has played c' in the first period, we have:
or instance, the principal can require a cost target c = p-e* and give transfer s = $(e*).The first-period distortion (which exceeds the second-period one) is equal to:
A)(-$(e*) + $(e*-+A($(e*)-$(e*-(p-P)))] + 0, when -P,,goes t o p .
One can show that the optimal full pooling cost target c satisfies:
l+hbp($.(~-
(here 1= P, using the convexity of 4, and the assumption that #' is bounded below by k.
Combining (4.10) and (4.11), we obtain:
Let us now come back to the sequence of economies. Consider a sequence of costs and suprema of types that choose these costs: (cf, ci, P : , P,'). We want to show that in the limit, c; and cZ, must be "sufficiently far apart." Using a Taylor expansion as and j3, ' are close to p, and inequality (4.12), we get (4.13) implies that there can be at most one of the two cost levels that belongs to the equilibrium path as well as to the interval [ p-e* -5, p -e* + {I, where ( p -e*) is the optimal effort in the limit (when n goes to infinity) and { is a given strictly positive constant. Thus, the fraction of firms that choose the other cost level must be negligible if the distortion relative to the first best is to converge to zero (which must be the case if the equilibrium dominates the full pooling optimum). More generally, we must allow for the possibility that the suprema of types playing some costs and still active in the second period be equal. (4.13) applies only when these suprema differ painvise. However, it tells us that, for a gven n, there exists p,, and a set Cn of equilibrium cost levels such that the corresponding suprema for all these cost levels coincide and are equal to Pn, and these cost levels are chosen by a fraction (1 -E) of types, where E can be taken arbitrarily small if the equilibrium dominates the full pooling optimum.
That the equilibrium must exhibit pooling on a large scale follows: since cost levels in C, are chosen by a fraction (1 -E) of types and all cost levels have the same supremum, there exists at least one cost level which is an optimal strategy for two types sufficiently far apart. Last, if the equilibrium does not exhibit infinite reswitching, for any two cost levels c0 and c' in C,, c0 is strictly preferred to c' in an interval (P, Pn) and p, cannot be the supremum for c'. Hence, there can exist only one cost in C,,, which means that the equilibrium is, up to E, a full pooling equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Let us discuss Proposition 2. For small uncertainty, the regulator must either impose, up to a fraction E of the firms, a cost target (full pooling) or resort to an equilibrium with an infinite amount of reswitching and still much pooling. Appendix A constructs such an equilibrium, which is depicted in Figure 1 .The principal offers two {cost, transfer) pairs. The two costs are c and c". Firms in [_P, B] strictly prefer c. Firms in [P, p] are indifferent between c and c" and randomize between these two costs. Appendix A shows that this first-period randomization can be chosen so that the principal's posterior, and thus, the firm's second-period rent, maintain the equality between U and 0over this interval. It can also be shown that c and c" can be chosen arbitrarily close (by choosing j ? close to p); hence, a priori, this equilibrium need not be suboptimal for small uncertainty.
We have been unable to show that full pooling is optimal for small uncertainty. Note that Proposition 2 implies that if the regulator is constrained to induce a "simple" equilibrium (pooling or partition), he chooses to impose a cost target (pooling). In the class of full pooling equilibria, the best cost target is easy to characterize (see footnote 12). If such a cost target is imposed, the firm's first-period effort decreases with efficiency (while it increases with efficiency in the static model). Furthermore, in spite of the ratchet effect, there is not underprovision of effort in the first period. Indeed, it is possible to show that under a quadratic disutility of effort and a uniform prior, the average marginal disutility of first-period effort over the population of types is the same as in the static (or full commitment) incomplete information case. And, for P close to 6 , the firm works harder than in the first best! This is due to the fact that the regulator foresees this ratchet effect and forces the less efficient types to work very hard to avoid an excessive amount of shirking by the efficient types. Lastly, ( s t ) over the population of types grows over time (while it is constant under commitment). The optimal full pooling equilibrium in the uniform-quadratic case is represented in Figure 2 .
In Figure 2 , a denotes the curvature of the disutility of effort function ( $ ( e ) = ae2/2). The symmetric information effort level is then e* = l/a. The areas between the effort function under commitment and that under the optimal full pooling in the first period are denoted by S, and S, and are equal in the quadratic-uniform case.
PARTITION VS. NONPARTITION EQUILIBRIA
The natural type of continuation equilibrium to look for in dynamic incentive problems like this is the partition equilibrium, in which [P,p]can be divided into a (countable) number of ordered intervals such that in tKe first period all types in an interval choose the same cost level, and two types in two different intervals choose different cost levels (for examples of partition equilibria in sender-receiver games, see Crawford-Sobel (1982) ). The case of full pooling is a degenerate partition equilibrium in which there is only one such interval. Before proceeding, let us make the following notational remark: Because all cost levels pertain to the first period, we no longer include time notation. From now on, a subscript refers to a cost level, and not to a period.
We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for arbitrary first period incentive schemes to admit a nondegenerate partition equilibrium in the continuation game, when the disutility of effort is quadratic (or, more generally, a-convex,13 as the reader will notice).
PROPOSITION
ae*/2), 3 (Necessary Condition): Assume + is quadratic (+(e) = and the equilibrium is a partition equilibrium. If c, and c, are two equilibrium cost levels, (c, -c,l >, 6/a.
Proposition 3 states that the minimum distance between two equilibrium costs in a partition equilibrium is equal to the discount factor divided by the curvature of the disutility of effort.
PROOFOF PROPOSITION the 3: Let {P,) denote the cutoff points and {c,) equilibrium costs in a partition equilibrium. Agents with types in (P,, P,,,) choose cost c, (where P, < /I,+,). Agent P, is indifferent between c, and c,-,. It is easily seen that c, increases with k: firm P,,, does not have a second-period rent when choosing c, or c,-, (from fact 2):
Also, firm P, does not enjoy a second-period rent when choosing c,-,, but enjoys a strictly positive rent when choosing c,. Thus,
Adding these two inequalities and using the convexity of li/ leads to c, > c,-,. Next, define the function A ,(P) on [P,, P, + ,I: -1) ). To interpret A,(P), remember that the principal's posterior beliefs about the agent's type when the agent chooses c,-, is the prior truncated on [Pk-,, P,].
Thus, the agent with type P,, and a fortiori with type P > P,, enjoys no second-period rent when he chooses c,-,. When he chooses c,, however, the posterior puts all the weight to [P,, P,,,] and the agent enjoys a rent that we denote II(,f31ck). Thus, A,(P) is the difference in intertemporal profits for agent P in [P,, Pk+,] when he chooses c, and c,-,. By definition, A ,(P,) = 0. If we want the agent with type (P, + e) to choose c,, it must be the case that A','(Pk) 2 0, or (5.1) -lkr(Pk-~k) +6flr(bklck) + + ' ( P k -~k -l ) > o .
13+ is a-convex if I)" > cr everywhere.
From Fact 3 ("no distortion at the top" result), we know that II'(/3,(ck) = -1. Thus, a necessary condition is:
Because the regulator can also commit to severely punish the firm's deviation from desired equilibrium behavior (except its exiting), we can define a set of "allowed cost-transfer pairs" among which all types must choose. We now state the following Proposition: PROPOSITION 4 (Sufficient Condition): Assume $ is quadratic ($(e) = ae2/2) and Assumption M is satisJied. If the principal offers a Jinite set of allowed cost-transfer pairs {s,, ck) such that I c, -cII >, 6/a for all (k, I), there exists a partition equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 4 is provided in Appendix B. It is a constructive proof, which works by "backward induction" from p. It starts by noticing that type p, who never enjoys a second-period rent, maximizes its first-period profit. It then constructs the cut-off points of the partition equilibrium by moving towards -/3. (Note that in this construction not all {s,, c,} pairs need be chosen in equilibrium.)
We thus see that, contrary to the case in which sending a message is costless (as in Crawford-Sobel (1982) ),14 the existence of a partition equilibrium requires some stringent assumptions. Indeed, it is possible to construct first-period incentive schemes for which there exists neither a partition equilibrium, nor a full-pooling (degenerate partition) equilibrium in the continuation game; see Appendix C.
DISCUSSION
We here test the robustness of our results to the continuum and perfect correlation assumptions.
(a) The Finite Case
We have verified that the intuition and the characterization results obtained for the continuous case also hold for the large, but finite case (finite number of types for the agent and finite number of potential cost-transfer pairs for the principal). For instance, Proposition 1can be stated informally: Z] denote an arbitrary cost range and [/3, p] the uncertainty range. Assume that the set of potential eficiencies in the uncertainty range is Jinite, and that the principal is bound to offer a Jinite number of {cost, transfer} pairs, where the costs belong to the cost range. For any sl(.) and for a suficiently large number of potential eficiencies, there exists no separating equilibrium.
14Here, the sender is the agent and the receiver the principal. The message is the first-period cost.
PROOFOF PROPOSITION 1': See Appendix D.
Thus, with a finite number of types, separation may be feasible, but as the grid becomes fine, equilibrium costs must go to -oo or + oo to allow separation. This clearly cannot be optimal for the principal. We checked that (the natural analogs of) Propositions 2, 3, and 4 also hold in the finite case, but their statements are cumbersome.
For comparison, in Laffont-Tirole (1987) , we solved the two-type case. Even under our assumptions, incentive constraints are, in general, binding "upwards" and "downwards" (contrary to the static case). This leads to several potential equilibrium configurations. For instance there can exist continuation equilibria that exhibit "double randomization:" Both types randomize between two cost levels in the first period (in the spirit of the continuation equilibrium exhibited in Appendix A). We were able to obtain the optimal scheme numerically. But more generally, the number of potential equilibrium configurations grows rapidly with the number of types, and a numerical analysis becomes hard to perform.
(b) Imperfect T or relation'^ We have assumed that the firm's characteristic is invariant over time. More generally, one could consider a second-period conditional cumulative distribution G2(P2(Pl) (not to be confused with the regulator's posterior beliefs as a function of sl(.) and c,). To keep emphasizing the ratchet effect in its extreme form, we focus on the case of almost perfect correlation. More precisely, we fix the first period cumulative distribution Fl(Pl) and we consider a sequence of second period conditional cumulative distributions G;(P21P1) indexed by n (n tending to infinity), such that there exists ~( n ) > 0 satisfying limn , , e(n) = 0 and lim {G,"(P1 + e(n)lP1) -G,"(P1-e(n)lP1)) = 1, uniformly over PI. Thus, the second-period distribution puts most of its weight around the first-period value. p2 is learned (by the firm only) at the beginning of the second period.
PROPOSITION 5: Under almost perfect correlation, a separating equilibrium is not optimal. That is, there exists no such that for n > no, any separating equilibrium is dominated by the optimal full pooling equilibrium.
Note that Proposition 5 does not say that full pooling is optimal in the general class of incentive schemes, but only that it dominates any separating equilibrium. Its proof, which is very similar to that of Proposition 1, is provided in Appendix E.
CONCLUSION
A well-known conclusion of the theory of screening is that under a mild condition on the distribution of uncertainty, the optimal incentive scheme his section has benefited from discussions with D. Baron, R. Gibbons, and M. Whinston induces full separation. The leitmotiv of our paper is that full separation becomes impossible or very costly in a repeated relationship without commitment. The economic consequence is that in such circumstances agents can only be given "low-powered" incentive schemes.
Although our results clearly indicate that much pooling is desirable, work remains to be done to characterize the whole set of implementable allocations and determine the optimal incentive scheme. The model should also be extended to allow more than two periods, as well as cost uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX A
The nonpartition equilibrium we construct is depicted in Figure 1 . The first-period incentive scheme offers two levels of cost c < F, and associated transfers: s < K Let I I ( P I c ) and I I ( P 1 F) denote firm p's second period rent when it has chosen c or F in the first period.
And let and
Assume that + is quadratic: +(e) = e2/2, that p --P = 1, and that the prior f, is uniform on [F,p] :
The continuati~n-equilibriumwe construct has the following property: firms in [P, $1 produce at cost c. Firms in [P, PI are indifferent between pr_o&ucing at c and producing at F. TLey randomize in such a way that the posterior distributions on [P, P ] given c and S are uniform on this interval.
Let us introduce some more notation before constructing the equilibrium. Let g and g denote the unconditional densities of firms choosing c and f: g(P) + g(P) = 1 for all /3. And let f and f denote the conditional (posterior) densities given that c and F have been chosen in the first period. Since the densities are uniform, we have:
where g is the (uniform) density on [ p , p ] of firms choosing cost c; if P E [ p , p ] We now put conditions on the parameters g (the uniform unconditional density given c is chosen), /? and the costs and transfers levels, so that this is indeed an equilibrium. These conditions are:
Condition (A.l) says that firm p is indifferent between the two cost levels (remember that firm p never has any_seco~d-period rent). Condition (A.2) insures that the indifference between costs c and F is kept from /3 to /3, as we now show. Let e(P) and Z(P) denote firm P's second-period effort when it has chosen cost c or F. Let us show that, for all /3 in [B, p] , U(P) = fi(/3). Given (A.l), it suffices to show that, for all /3 in [P, PI, u(P) = fi(P), or
where we use the fact that the derivative of the second-period rent is equal to minus the marginal disutility of effort (see Section 2). Next, the posterior densities satisfy condition M on [P, -PI. From the formula in Fact 4 and using the fact that + is quadratic, we know that:
and where F and f are the cumulative distributions corresponding to f and f:, on [ p , p]:
and So, on [P, P I : and (A.3) then becomes (using the fact that + is quadratic):
which is nothing but condition (A.2).
To complete the proof that this is indeed an equilibrium, we m-ust first shoy that the parameters can be chosen so that g is less than 1, and also that for /3 in [P, PI, U(P) > U(/3).
-
It is easy to ensure that is less than one. It suffices to take p close to P. To check that firms in [P, prefer to choose -c, it suffices to show that, on this interval, u(P) 26(/3), or
Since condition M is satisfied for the posterior distribution given c, we have, for P in [P, p] : -On the other hand, d(P) = Z(p) -( p -p ) (in the second period, P, which is tp the left of the real lower bound /3 of the posterior distribution, does produce at the same cost as P). So:
Using the fact that + is quadratic, the condition for ii(/3) G 6(b)becomes, for any P in [P, p], -which is satisfied from condition (A.2) and the fact that g < 1.
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B PROOFOF PROPOSITION CONDITIONS 4 (SUFFICIENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTITION EQUILIBRIUM)
Let c0 denote the argmax, {s(c) -+ ( p -c)) where c E r, the set of allowed costs. If there are ties, take c0 to be the lowest of the arg max. Firm /3 chooses cO, since whatever the planner's beliefs in period 2, it will get a zero surplus in that period. Let Po= p.
Let II(Pl [P, Po]) denote firm p's second-period profit when the planner's posterior distribution is the prior distribution truncated at /3 (i.e., the planner knows that the firm's type belongs to the interval [ p , PI). II is continuous in p, and is equal to 0 for /3 = Po (from Fact 2). Define the function hO(P):
We know that h0 is continuous and that from the definition of cO, hO(P) is strictly positive for P close (or equal) to Po. Let P1 = max ( P ( h 0 ( P ) = 0 and hO(P-e ) < 0 for any sufficiently small E > O), and let c' denote the corresponding cost (as before, in case of ties, choose the lowest such cost). If there exists no such above /3 or if there exists no c < c0 (so that h0 is not defined), then the equilibrium is a pure pooling one. Assume that P1 > P.
Let us notice that if in (B.1) we maximized over c 5 c 0 rather than over c < cO, hO(P) would always be positive: we have But, for all c, from the definition of cO, s o -+(pO-cO) > s ( c ) -+(Po -c). Using P < Po and c > cO, and the convexity of +, then leads to Thus, in our quest for P1, we can restrict ourselves to costs under cO. This property (with the same proof) will hold at each stage of our algorithm.
Next, define the function hl(P):
h1 is continuous; and from the construction of c', h1 is strictly positive for P slightly under P1. Let P2= max ( p G P1I h1(p) = 0 and hl(P -E)< 0 for any sufficiently small E), and let c2 denote the corresponding cost (in case of ties, choose the lowest such cost).
( p k , ck) is then constructed by induction until either there exists no Pk>-/3 that satisfies hk( p k ) = 0 and h k ( p k -E ) < 0 for small E, or there is no allowed cost level left.
The partition equilibrium we propose has type P in (pkC1, p k ) choose cost ck (the zero-probability cut-off types are indifferent between two cost levels). When cost c is played, that does not belong to the equilibrium path, Bayes' rule does not pin down posterior beliefs. We will assume that the principal then believes that the agent has type /3 (the reader who worries about the plausibility of this conjecture should remember that the principafis always free not to allow such cost levels, so that the problem does not arise). Let us first show that a type /3 in [ p k C 1 , p k ] does not prefer a cost c < ck. From the construction of pkf', we know that
for some c < ck.
Next, II'(p1 [ p k + ' , pk]) is equal to minus the marginal disutility of effort by agent P in the second period. Since the posterior beliefs are the truncated prior on [pkC1, pk], Assumption M (monotone hazard rate) is satisfied, as is easily checked. From Fact 4, the marginal disutility of effort is lower than 1. Thus:
since the distance between the allowed costs exceeds 6/a. Second, we must show that3 type /3 in [ p k + ' , p k ] does not prefer a cost c > ck. We prove thjs by "backward induction" from /3. Let us suppose that we have shown that for any /3 in [ p k , PI, /3 prefers to play its presumed optimal cost to playing a higher cost. ( where II(Plc) is agent P's second-period rent when it chooses cost c in the first period. Notice that, by induction and from the fact that ck is an optimal strategy for p k , To prove our property, it suEices to show that A$(@, c) 0 on [ p k + ' , pk]. But, we have:
If c does not belong to the equilibrium path, from our updating rule, we have I11(/31c) = 0. If c belongs to the equilibrium path, c = c' with I < k, then n l ( P l c ) = -+'(e* -(pl+l-p)) > -1 (see Fact 4: the /3-agent mimics the cost chosen by the lower possible type given the second-period posterior beliefs). In both cases, II'(b J c) 2 -1,so that Thus, the agent with type /3 does not want to choose c > ck either.
Q.E. D.
APPENDIX C Let us assume that 4 is quadratic: 4 = e2/2, say, and that /3 is uniformly distributed on [1, 2] .
Suppose that the principal offers two cost-transfer pairs {co, so) and (c,, sl). Assume w.1.o.g. that co > c,. If co -c, < 6, we know from Proposition 3 that there exists no (nondegenerate) partition equilibrium. Let us now show that one can choose the parameters so that there exists no pooling equilibrium either. Assume that the transfers satisfy: (C.1)
s~-+ (~-c~) = s~-~(~-c~) + E ,
where E is strictly positive and small. Equation (C.1) says that type p = 2 slightly prefers co (remember that this type never enjoys a second-period rent). Thus, a full pooling equilibrium must be at cost c,.
To give the full pooling equilibrium at co its best chance, let us assume that when the agent plays c, (a zero-probability event), the principal believes he has type P = 1, so that the agent does not enjoy a second-period rent. Let fl(P1[1,2]) denote agent p's rent when the posterior coincides with the prior, and define:
to be the difference in intertemporal payoffs for agent P. We know that A(2) = E. We have:
Af ( So there is an increasing relationship between the cost levels chosen on the equilibrium path, and the supremum of the types that choose these costs. Now, consider two "adjacent" levels of cost belonging to the equilibrium path: c, < ck+,. We have particular, by choosing a "grid" k sufficiently small, one can find n sufficiently large such that the first-period costs are arbitrarily large or small (so that the effort distortion is arbitrarily large) for a nonnegligible set of firms. Hence, the distortion imposed by a revealing equilibrium relative to the full information case tends to infinity as n tends to infinity. It is clear that the regulator can do better by imposing a cost target (full pooling). Q. E. D.
